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3Prologue:  GAO Recommends Change To Tech/Prod 
Development Practices – Circa 1999
• Adopt a disciplined, knowledge-based method, evolutionary 
acquisition process. 
• Set standards—such asTRLs--for assessing technology 
readiness that are based on a technology’s demonstrated 
readiness for integration and its criticality to the weapon 
system.
• Require that technologies demonstrate a high readiness level 
–TRL 7-- before Milestone B of a major acquisition.
• Provide more flexibility to acquisition programs with regard to 
a weapon system’s performance requirements.
• Consider requiring S&T organizations to mature technologies 
further and empower them with additional funding and 
improved organization.
4Outcomes Since Then: 
Outcomes From DOD Development Efforts Circa 2005
• While future demographics will demand more from DOD’s 
investment accounts, current practices yield systems at 
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Source: Selected Acquisition Report data (12/31/96 and 12/31/03) on the 8 weapon systems among the highest R&D budget requests for 








5Outcomes Since Then: 
Immature Technologies Impact SDD Circa 2006
• Average Program Research, Development, Test and 
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Source: Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.  GAO-06-391. Washington, DC.: March 2006.
6Outcomes Since Then: 
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7Latest Review: 
Objective, Scope, and Methodology
• Objective was to identify best ways to transition technologies 
to product lines, assess practices used by the military 
services, and determine potential improvements for DOD.
• Visited 4 best practice companies (IBM, Motorola, 3M, and 
Boeing), met with key science and technology (S&T) and 
product development officials to identify best practices for 
technology transition and supporting tools.
• Met with DOD S&T officials from OSD, services’ acquisition 
programs, and services’ labs. Also reviewed several lab & 
acquisition programs.
• Conducted our review from July 2005 through May 2006 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards.
8Private Industry Findings: 
Key Enablers
• Have strong strategic planning to prioritize technology 
needs and a structured technology development 
process as precursor to transition.
• Merge technology development and product 
development activities prior to product launch.
• Use 3 tools to support technology transition:
• Relationship managers
• Technology Transition Agreements
• Metrics
9Private Industry Findings: 
Strategic Processes Smooth Path To Transition
• Strong strategic planning processes used to identify and 
react to market needs quickly.
• Structured, gated technology development process.
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Private Industry Findings: 
Hybrid Phase Merges Tech and Product Development
• Hybrid phase used to merge technology development and 
product development activities prior to product launch.  
• Responsibilities for managing and funding technology 
development gradually shift from labs to product line during 
this phase.
General Flow of Process Leading Up to Technology Transition
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Private Industry Findings: 
Relationship Managers Provide Communications Link
Relationship managers from labs and product lines serve 
as a communication link between the two communities 
and work out transition issues. 
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Private Industry Findings: 
Technology Transition Agreements/Metrics
• Technology transition agreements document decisions 
made between labs and product lines:
• Contain specific quantifiable cost, schedule, performance, and 
manufacturability metrics the labs must demonstrate before 
product line acceptance.
• Feasibility, relevancy, and application of each technology are 
assessed in an effort to identify potential barriers to technology 
transition.
• Identify lab and product line funding commitments, including 
recurring manufacturing costs associated with integrating the 
new technology on a product.
• Some agreements may include loaning key lab technologists to 
the product line for a period of time in order to maintain 





• DOD does not adequately prioritize the technologies that 
are most critical to acquisition programs.
• DOD does not merge S&T and product line activities  
prior to product launch; Transition often occurs at 
product launch irrespective of whether technologies are 
mature. 
• New tools to support transition are being used, but: 
• Not as comprehensive as industry best practices.
• Use is not widespread.
14
DOD Findings: 
Inconsistent Prioritization and Dev Processes
DOD is not well positioned to develop and mature needed 
technologies on time.
• Strategic planning process does not consistently 
prioritize technologies most critical to acquisition 
programs.
• Military services have established S&T boards to 
select and oversee new technology projects, which 
increases visibility for some technologies, but the 
scope varies across military services. 
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DOD Findings: Technology and Product 
Development Still not Effectively Aligned
• S&T and acquisition communities do not communicate well and 
are not aligned in a way to effectively meet priorities, resulting in: 
• Irrelevant technologies advancing to final stages of lab development without 
commitment to field the technologies.
• Technology not being ready to transition when needed.
• Acquisition not being prepared to take over funding responsibilities.
DOD does not have a structured, gated S&T technology 
development process with deliverables to guide investments.
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DOD Findings: 
Technology Transition Tools Underutilized
• Relationship Managers
• Generally used to market lab technology; not as a communication 
tool to assist in technology transition.
• Technology Transition Agreements
• Use and coverage vary greatly among service S&T programs
• Contain some of the same elements seen in industry, but typically 
do not require the technology developer to demonstrate cost 
metrics.
• Tool used mainly by labs; not highly valued by acquisition 
community.
• Metrics
• Few metrics used to gauge the impact of investments or the 




Some Promising Initiatives For Transition
• Advanced Concept/Joint Concept Technology Demonstration
(ACTD/JCTD) -- Goal is to get technologies that meet critical needs 
to users faster and at lower cost, refine the the selection process to 
better match user priorities, and provide more funding in early 
stages of demonstration.
• Manufacturing Technology Program -- Aimed at quickly 
identifying and solving technology transition problems; focusing on 
affordable, low-risk development and production
• Foreign Comparative Testing & Technology Transition Initiative
-- FCT identifies, evaluates, and procures technologies developed 
by other countries. TTI speeds transition of DOD lab developed 
technologies to acquisition programs.
18
Recommendations
• Develop gated process that establishes a transition phase and 
defines activities that should occur during this phase.
• Allocate more 6.4 funds for S&T to manage technologies to higher 
readiness levels before they move to acquisition programs.
• Expand the use of technology transition agreements DOD-wide.
• Include additional metrics in technology transition agreements.
• Expand the use of relationship managers and define 
responsibilities. 
• Adopt additional process-oriented metrics to measure the 




For further details, see GAO report: GAO-06-883, Best 
Practices: Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DOD 
Technology Transition Processes (September 2006) at 
www.gao.gov, or contact Michael Sullivan at 
sullivanm@gao.gov.
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Context: The Fiscal Environment
$42.1 B$47.9 B
Additional investment
needed under FY 2005
plan for completing the 
8 programs
FY 1998 plan for completing
development of 8 programs
FY ’05: $89.95 billion total RDT&E $
Source: Selected Acquisition Report data (12/31/96 and 12/31/03) on the 8 weapon systems among the highest R&D budget 
requests for FY 2003.  Note: All dollars are in constant FY 2005 dollars.
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Current Condition: TRLS for Technologies At 
The Time They Were Included In Product Designs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Non-penetrating periscope
Ford’s adaptive cruise control
Ford’s night vision 
Ford’s voice activated controls
Hughes’ solar cell array
High-speed planing craft


















Prologue: Outcomes of Past Major Weapon 
System Acquisitions
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88 percent 62 percent 
Hughes HS-702 satellite 








   Adaptive cruise control 






aThe Comanche, in particular, has experienced a great deal of cost growth and schedule slippage for many reasons, of 
which technology immaturity is only one.  Other factors, such as changing the scope, funding, and pace of the program for 
affordability reasons, have also contributed. 
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Outcomes Since Then: 
Constructive Policy Changes, Implementation Challenges
• DOD 5000 policy says most of the right things about 
separating technology development from system development
• Calls for technology maturity to TRL 6 (relevant environment)
• Calls for evolutionary approach as a check on reqts.
• Short development cycle times (5 years or less)
• However,
• Best practice standard is TRL 7 (operational environment)
• Most individual programs do not even abide by policy
• Many programs fall outside: satellites, MDA, ships
• Those within are unique: eg., FCS, JSF
• Preference is still for revolutionary, not evolutionary
• Knowledge gaps and optimistic estimates at MS B are the norm 
and are reinforced with approval and funding
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Prologue: 
DSB Report on the Effect of Immature Technology
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Current Outcomes:  % Programs that Achieved 
Technology Readiness at Key Junctures




























• 23.5% change in weighted 
average cycle time.
Programs included in cost and schedule 
analysis:  AEHF, MUOS, NPOESS, WGS, 
Patriot/MEADS, ARH, Excalibur, FCS, Warrior 
UAS, EA-18G, EFSS, V-22, AESA, E-2D, AHE, 
JTRS HMS, JTRS GMR, Land Warriior, WINT-
T, ERM, CVN-21, C-5AMP, C-5 RERP, F-22A 
Mod, Global Hawk, JSF Reaper, P-8AMMA.  
We limited analysis to these because all data 
including cost, schedule, and quantities were 
available for comparison purposes.
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Private Industry Findings: Adaptive Cruise 
Control Technology and Jaguar Requirements
























Private Industry Findings: Use of Project and 
Process Metrics
• Project metrics used to assess the status of technology 
development and whether the technology meets 
product needs 
• Size, weight, power, and reliability, as well as 
nonrecurring development and/or manufacturing costs.
• Process metrics provide information on the status, 
timeliness and impact of technology development 
efforts.  
• Return on investment, cycle time, technology yield, 
number of technologies commercialized, customer 
survey results.
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Private Industry Findings: Knowledge-Based 
Evolutionary Product Development 
Product Launch
Point
Tech. Development Integration Demonstration Produce
Tech. Development Integration Demonstration Produce










S&T Manager Product Manager
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Private Industry Findings: Notional Boeing 
Technology Maturity Scorecard
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DOD Findings: Use of Technology Transition 
Agreements Increasing
• Technology transition agreements are starting to be used; however, 
use and coverage vary greatly among service S&T programs.
• About 65 percent of technology projects identified by the services as 
transition candidates had agreements.  This is a small portion of the 
total S&T project portfolio.
• Agreements contain some of the same elements seen in industry, 
such as technology description, key personnel, and performance 
characteristics required by the prospective user.
• Typically do not require the technology developer to demonstrate
cost metrics.
• Tool used mainly for S&T; Acquisition community does not value as 
highly.
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DOD Findings: Metrics Are Underutilized
• Metrics continue to be acknowledged as a problem for the 
services.
• Transition agreements include many of the same metrics 
as leading companies, but are not available for most 
technology projects.
• Few metrics are used to gauge the impact of investments 
and the effectiveness of processes for developing and 
transitioning technologies.
• DOD Foreign Comparative Testing Program has 
established metrics to measure health, success, and cost-
effectiveness of the program.
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DOD Findings: Use of Relationship Managers 
is Underutilized 
• DARPA uses relationship managers in a manner consistent 
with leading private companies.
• When used, relationship managers generally are used by the 
military to market lab technology; not as a joint communication 
vehicle between labs and acquisition to assist in technology 
transition.
• DOD depends on Integrated Product Teams and annual 
corporate board reviews to communicate technology 
development activities.
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Outcomes Since Then: 
Reduced Buying Power For Major Programs
35



















Outcomes Since Then: 
Same Problems Under Revised Policy Circa 2006 
Source: Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience Cost And Schedule Problems Under DOD’s Revised 
Policy. GAO-06-368. Apr. 13, 2006
TRL 6 or greater
Less than TRL 6
Percent Cost Growth
